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Kelley: Physician Owes Duty of Care to Third Party When His Negligence in

NEGLIGENCE-THIRD PARTY LIABILITY -Physician Owes
Duty of Care to Third Party When His Negligence in
Failing To Warn Patient Not To Drive Contributes to
Third Party's Injury.
Gooden v. Tps,
651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
Eugene Tips, M.D., prescribed the drug Quaalude' for his patient, Edith
Goodpasture. 2 While Goodpasture was driving her car under the influence of the drug, she struck the plaintiff, Earl Gooden.3 Gooden brought
suit against Dr. Tips, 4 alleging that he was negligent both in prescribing
the drug to his patient and in failing to warn her not to operate a vehicle
while taking the medication.' The trial court granted Dr. Tips' motion for
summary judgment,6 and Gooden appealed to the Tyler Court of Appeals.7 Held-Reversedand remanded A physician owes a duty of care to
a third party when his negligence in failing to warn a patient not to drive
contributes to the third party's injury.'
Duty relates to the question of whether an individual is obligated to act
1. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
Quaalude, generically known as methaqualone, is "a sedative and hypnotic resembling
short-acting barbituates." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 772 (Lawyers' 3d ed. 1972).
2. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ). Goodpasture had been a patient of Dr. Tips for approximately twenty years prior to the accident.
See id at 365.
3. See id at 365.
4. See id at 365. The action was originally brought against Goodpasture, but the
plaintiff amended the petition to make Dr. Tips a defendant after learning during discovery
proceedings that Goodpasture was under the influence of Quaalude at the time of collision.
See id at 365.
5. See id at 365. Dr. Tips was treating Goodpasture for a number of medical
problems, including drug abuse and depression. See id at 365. The plaintiff alleged that
Dr. Tips was aware that Goodpasture had a past history of abusing drugs; thus, he could not
expect her to take the prescription in the intended manner. See id at 365.
6. See id at 365. Dr. Tips alleged that since there was no doctor-patient relationship
between himself and the plaintiff, he owed the plaintiff no duty of care. See id at 365.
7. See id at 365.
8. See id at 369-70. The court stated that Dr. Tips had a duty to warn Goodpasture
not to drive under the circumstances alleged. See id at 370. The case, however, was remanded for a determination of whether this duty was breached. See id at 370. Only if Dr.
Tips failed to issue a warning could a breach occur. See id at 370. Furthermore, the court
explicitly stated that Dr. Tips had no duty to prevent Goodpasture from driving, if she so
desired. See id at 370.
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according to a legal standard of care towards another, 9 and a person can-

not be held liable for negligence by one to whom he owes no duty.' ° Generally, a duty to exercise ordinary care is owed to all foreseeable parties. I
A duty to exercise a certain standard of care may also be created by contract; 1 2 however, courts have traditionally limited such a duty only to the
parties to the contract.' 3 This relationship to the contract, known as priv-

9. See, e.g., Merluzzi v. Larson, 610 P.2d 739, 742 (Nev. 1980) (duty is to comport with
appropriate standard of care in light of apparent risk); Wytupeck v. Camden, 136 A.2d 887,
893 (N.J. 1957) (duty is obligation to conform to particular standard of conduct towards
another); Lumpkins v. Thompson, 553 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977,
writ retd n.r.e.) (duty is conforming to act as ordinary person would in same circumstances);
see alsoW. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 324 (4th ed. 1971) (duty relates to
obligation to act with reasonable care towards another).
10. See Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 91 Tex. 60, 62, 41 S.W. 62, 63 (1897) (no
duty to keep property safe for trespassers, so no possible negligence); Thompson v. Graham,
333 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, writ refd n.r.e.) (no duty to bolt stairs,
failure to do so not negligence); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, 166 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1942, no writ) (no duty to odorize gas so failure to do so not negligence);
Wichita Falls & S.R. Co. v. Hesson, 151 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1941,
writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (failure of railroad to maintain signal light and bell not negligence
because no duty to do so); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Hawthorne, 135 S.W.2d 531, 532-33 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (failure to warn another of approaching car not negligence because no duty to do so); Independent E. Torpedo Co. v. Carter, 131
S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939, no writ) (no duty to fill oil well with water
before shooting the well, so failure to do so not negligence); Freeman v. B.F. Goodrich
Rubber Co., 127 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ dism'd by agr.) (failure
to read and understand affidavit not negligence because no duty to do so); Hughes Prod. Co.
v. Hagan, 114 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1937, writ dism'd) (no duty to
make property safe so no negligence in failing to do so).
I1. See Hale v. Crestline Realty, Inc., 173 A.2d 500, 502 (Conn. 1961) (injury to trespassers not foreseeable so no duty owed); Joyce v. Nash, 630 S.W.2d 219, 222-25 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (harm to customer unforeseeable so no duty arose); Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 358
S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (Tex. 1962) (apartment manager could not foresee injuries to child so no
liability); Watkins v. Davis, 308 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, writ refd
n.r.e.) (injury must be reasonably foreseeable consequence of negligence); Anderson v.
Green Bay & W. R.R., 299 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (duty established when
reasonable person could foresee harm). But see Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 27-29 (Cal.
1954) (duty not necessarily created by foreseeable risk).
12. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508,
510 (1947). "A party to a contract owes a common-law duty to perform with care, skill,
reasonable expendience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure
to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract." Id at 510;
see also Westbrook v. Watts, 268 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ refd
n.r.e.) (duty created by contract must be performed with reasonable care); Panhandle Gravel
Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ refd n.r.e.) (failure to perform duty created by contract with reasonable care results in tort and breach of
contract).
13. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 402-03 (Ex. D. 1842). In
Winterbotom the defendant contracted with the owner of a mail coach to keep it in repair.
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ity, 14 automatically placed an injured third party beyond the realm of forseeability."5 The predominate rationale underlying the traditional
requirement of privity was to protect the defendant from unlimited
liability.16
The erosion of the privity doctrine began in the area of products liability.17 In 1852, an exception to the privity defense was recognized if the

See id at 403. As a result of the defendant's negligence the coach collapsed and a passenger
was injured. See id at 403. The court held that because the passenger was not a party to the
contract he could not recover in tort. See id at 402-03; see also Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U.S. 195, 199-200 (1879) (attorney cannot be liable to those not in privity); Weimar v. Yacht
Club Point Estates, Inc., 223 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (breach of duty
created by contract bars claim to one not in privity); Chemical Cleaning, Inc. v. BrindellBruno, Inc., 186 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (party not in privity cannot sue in tort
for breach of duty created by contract); Bisson v. John B. Kelly, Inc., 170 A. 139, 142 (Pa.
1934) (if duty breached was created by contract only those in privity can recover). But see,
e.g., Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769, 779 (Ill. 1964) (duty depends on
foreseeability, not privity); Marine Ins. Co. v. Strecker, 100 So. 2d 493, 496 (La. 1957) (lack
of privity no longer bars action in tort); Howell v. Betts, 362 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tenn. 1962)
(rule of no recovery in tort for lack of privity no longer exists).
14. Bonfils v. McDonald, 270 P. 650, 653 (Colo. 1928). The term "privity of contract"
has been defined as "that connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties." Id at 653 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 943).
15. See, e.g., Weimar v. Yacht Club Point Estates, Inc., 223 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1969) (only those in privity can recover in tort for breach of duty created by contract); Chemical Cleaning, Inc. v. Brindell-Bruno, Inc., 186 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. Ct. App.
1966) (no privity, no cause of action in tort for breach of duty created by contract); Bisson v.
John B. Kelly, Inc., 170 A. 139, 142 (Pa. 1934) (breach of duty created by contract allows
recovery in tort to only those in privity, even if harm foreseeable); see also Ward, Professional Malpractice. The Extent of Liability In Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX. B.J. 117, 120
(1979) (foreseeable injured party not in privity cannot recover for breach of duty created by
contract); Comment, Liability Of Architects And Engineers To Third Parties.: A New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 306, 311 (1977) (no privity, no recovery from professional for
negligence).
16. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444-45 (N.Y. 1931) (privity requirement protects defendant from indeterminate liability); see also Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d
656, 661 (Ill. 1969) (quoting rationale in Ultramares),"Anderson v. Boone County Abstract
Co., 418 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. 1967) (rationale in Ultramaresstated); Comment, Liability Of
Architects And Engineers To Third Parties.- A New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME LAw. 306,
312-13 (1977). The privity doctrine is also supported by the reasoning that those who do not
pay for a professional's services should not enjoy the benefit of duties created by those services. See id. at 313.
17. See Thomas v. Winchester, 57 Am. Dec. 455, 458-59 (N.Y. 1852); see generally
Ward, ProfessionalMalpractice: The Extent of Liability In Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX.
B.J. 117, 120 (1979) (privity first ignored in products liability); Comment, Liability OfArchitects And Engineers To Third Parties. A New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 306, 308
(1977) (products liability first disregarded privity); Comment, Lawyers' Negligence Liability
To Non-Clients: A Texas Viewpoint, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 405, 407 (1983) (first exception to
privity arose in products liability).
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product involved was extremely dangerous. I8 The privity requirement was
completely abandoned in this area in 1916, when Judge Cardozo held in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. '9 that a manufacturer of negligentlymade products would be liable for the reasonably foreseeable harm to
third parties, regardless of an absence of privity.2 ° The reasoning of the
court established a framework for the change from a privity-based standard to a negligence-based standard in products liability cases.2"
Privity has continued to be a controversial issue in cases involving third
party liability of professionals, all of whom are held to a higher standard
of care than the ordinary person.22 Not until recently have the courts begun to disregard the requirement of privity in this area.23 The MacPherson rationale was first extended in a case involving economic injury of a
third party by a professional in 1922.24 In 1931, however, Judge Cardozo
refused to extend the MacPherson rationale to the accounting profession in
18. See Thomas v. Winchester, 57 Am. Dec. 455, 458-59 (N.Y. 1852). Thomas bought
a bottle of poison from a druggist which was negligently mislabeled by the defendant manufacturer as harmless. See id. at 455. The court cited cases upholding the privity doctrine but
distinguished Thomas on the basis that death or serious harm was almost inevitable. See id
at 458.
19. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
20. See id at 1055. MacPherson was thrown from his car when a negligently manufactured wheel collapsed. See id at 1051. No privity between MacPherson and the manufacturer existed because MacPherson purchased the car from the dealer; thus only the dealer
and manufacturer were in privity. See id at 1051.
21. See id at 1053. Judge Cardozo stated that the principle of Winchester "is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature" but also applied when there is "knowledge of danger" which is "not merely possible, but probable." Id at 1053.
22. See Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). Professionals are not only required to conduct themselves as reasonable persons but are also required to possess a minimum standard of knowledge and care in their particular profession.
See id. at 529; City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 141 N.W. 181, 181-82 (Minn. 1913)
(accountants' standard); Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 78 S.E.2d 901, 907 (Va. 1953) (architects' standard); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965) (physicians'
standard); Ward v. Arnold, 328 P.2d 164, 167 (Wash. 1958) (attorneys' standard).
23. See Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1969) (attorneys may
be liable to third parties); Howell v. Fisher, 272 S.E.2d 19, 26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (engineers may be liable to third parties); Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895,
898-99, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 703-04 (1957) (architects may be liable to third parties); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ
refd n.r.e.) (accountants may be liable to third parties); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys.,
398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965) (physicians may be liable to third parties).
24. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (N.Y. 1922). In Glanzer, the defendant,
a certified public weigher, was hired by a seller of beans to certify their weight so that the
plaintiff-buyer would know how much to pay. See id at 275. The actual weight of the
beans was less than what was certified and the defendant knew that the plaintiff was relying
on the weight stated. See id at 275. The plaintiff thus paid a greater amount than he owed.
See id at 275. The court ignored the lack of privity and applied a standard negligence test,
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Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,2 5 and instead relied on the strict privity requirement.2 6 In the last decade the majority ofjurisidictions have rejected
the Ultramares rationale and have based accountants' third party liability
on whether the harm was foreseeable." Another group of professionals,
lawyers, have enjoyed a privity shield from third party suits in the majority
of jurisdictions,28 although the privity defense in the legal profession seems
to be in a state of transition.2 9 A third group, architects, belong to a profession in which the harm to a third party can be either economic or physical.3" In the landmark case of Inman v. Binghamton HousingAuthority, 3' it

holding the defendant liable because the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable individual.
See id. at 277.
25. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
26. See id. at 447. Ultramares involved creditors who relied on negligently prepared
financial statements prepared by public accountants hired by the borrower. See id at 44243. The creditors suffered economic injury because of their reliance. See id. at 443. The
court reasoned that allowing third party recovery based on a negligently prepared audit
would "expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class." Id at 444. Judge Cardozo distinguished Glanzer, stating
that in Glanzer there was more than the providing of a service "in the expectation that the
one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter ... [Glanzer] was a case where the
"
transmission of the certificate to another. . . [was] the end and aim of the transaction ..
Id. at 445. It has been said that "Cardozo weakened his opinion by making distinctions
where there were no differences." Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo And The Law Of Torts, 52
HARV. L. REV. 372, 400 (1939).
27. See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs,
455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 343-44 (D.
Neb. 1979); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 92-93 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v.
Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 402-03 (Iowa 1969); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 297
(Minn. 1976); Aluma Kraft Mfg. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383-85 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 360 (10th
Cir. 1971) (no privity, no recovery).
28. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205-06 (1879) (attorneys not liable to third
parties unless fraud shown); Favata v. Rosenberg, 436 N.E.2d 49, 51 (I. App. Ct. 1982) (no
third party liability for attorneys); McDonald v. Stewart, 182 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 1970)
(attorney immune from negligence liability to non-clients); Graham v. Turcotte, 628 S.W.2d
182, 184 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (no privity of contract so no liability for
attorney); see also Comment, Lawyers' Negligence Liability To Non-Clients." A Texas Viewpoint, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 405, 405 (1983) (majority of states limit duty to client).
29. See Ward, ProfessionalMalpractice: The Extent of Liability In Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX. B.J. 117, 121 (1979). The privity doctrine has been most frequently disregarded in cases where the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the attorney's client. See,
e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1969) (attorney held liable to
intended beneficiary of will for negligently failing to make testamentary change); Stowe v.
Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981) (attorney who negligently drafted will for client liable
to intended beneficiary); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (intended beneficiary of negligently drafted will may recover from attorney).
30. See Detweiler Bros. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416, 418 (E.D. Wash.
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was alleged that an architect negligently designed an apartment by failing
to provide a stairrail, resulting in injury to the third party plaintiff.3 2 The
court dismissed the case because no negligence was found, but adopted the
rationale used in MacPherson.33 Since Inman, the majority of jurisdictions addressing this question have abandoned the requirement of privity
in third party negligence actions against architects.3 4
In the medical profession, third party injury is usually physical rather
than economic. 35 To date, the medical profession has enjoyed the greatest
protection from negligence liability to third parties.36 Courts in at least
seven jurisidictions, however, have held that a doctor may be liable, despite a lack of privity, to foreseeable third parties.3 7
1976) (damages for misrepresentation of pipe quality); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.
2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1973) (economic injury incurred from building project); Miller v. DeWitt,
226 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ill. 1967) (roof collapsed on plaintiffs); Laukkamen v. Jewel Tea Co.,
222 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (supermarket pylon fell on plaintiff); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 222 N.E. 2d 752, 753 (Mass. 1967) (economic injury caused by inaccurate
measurements); Simon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 202 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Neb. 1972) (plaintiff fell through hole in floor).
31. 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
32. See id at 897-98, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
33. See id at 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04. The court stated that:
[T]here is no reason to believe that the law governing liability. . . should be, or is, in
any way different where real structures are involved instead of chattels. There is no
logical basis for such a distinction. . . . The principle inherent in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. case . . . cannot be made to depend upon the merely technical distinction
between a chattel and a structure built upon the land.
Id at 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.
34. See Detweiler Bros. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416, 420 (E.D. Wash.
1976) (lack of privity no bar to tort action brought by contractor against architect); Peerless
Ins. Co. v. Cerney & Assoc., 199 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D. Minn. 1961) (surety not in privity can
recover in negligence action against architect for economic injury); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla. 1973) (absent privity, contractor may still bring action against
architect for economic damage); Laukkamen v. Jewel Tea Co., 222 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1966) (privity not prerequisite for tort action against engineers for physical harm);
Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 222 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Mass. 1967) (economic recovery
against engineer allowed contractor not in privity).
35. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D. Neb. 1980) (suit
arose because of third party's death); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 33940, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-20 (1976) (action for third party's death); Bradley Center, Inc. v.
Wessner, 287 S.E.2d 716, 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (third party's death basis for action);
Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 577 (Iowa 1973) (bystander struck by car brought action); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 502-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (action
arose from third party's wrongful death); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 15
(Wash. 1965) (action stemmed from bus passenger's injury).
36. See Ward, Professional Malpractice." The Extent of Liability In Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEx. B.J. 117, 124 (1979).
37. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193-94 (D. Neb. 1980) (psychotherapist's failure to control patient proximate cause of third party's death); Tarasoff v.
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In Gooden v. Tps,38 a case of first impression in Texas,3 9 the Tyler Court
of Appeals considered whether a physician owed a duty to the public to
warn a patient not to drive when the physician knew or should have
known that the drug prescribed had an intoxicating effect. 40 The court
held that under the particular facts alleged such a duty existed when the
harm was foreseeable, 41 but stressed that its holding was limited only to a
duty to warn, not to control, the patient.42 In concluding that there was
only a duty to warn, the court relied on three cases from other jurisdictions
involving facts similar to those in Gooden, 43 and on two Texas statutes

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-20 (1976) (psycotherapist's failure to warn third party resulted in her death); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 287
S.E.2d 716, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (failure of hospital to control patient caused third
party's death); Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1973) (failure to diagnose
patient cause of third party's injury); Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 514-15 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1979) (psychiatrist's failure to warn third party resulted in third party's injury);
Wharton Transp. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 525-26 (Tenn. 1980) (failure to perform
physical exam properly resulted in third party's injury); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys.,
398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965) (failure to warn of drug's effect caused third party injury).
38. 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
39. See id at 366.
40. See id at 366. Directly following this statement of the issue the court restated the
issue in a broader manner: "[I]s
the physician under a duty to take whatever steps are
reasonable under the circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injury to third parties who
may be injured by that patient because said patient is under the influence of an intoxicating
drug prescribed by the physician?" Id at 366.
41. See id.at 369.
42. See id.at 370. The court made it clear that its holding was distinguished from those
in cases requiring the doctor to control his patient. See id at 370; Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (psychotherapist had duty to control patient);
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19-20 (1976)
(psychotherapist had duty to control patient); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 287 S.E.2d
716, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (hospital had duty to control patient); McIntosh v. Milano, 403
A.2d 500, 514-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (psychiatrist had duty to control patient).
Thus, if the patient drove despite the warning, the physician would not be required to prevent him from doing so. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983,
no writ).
43. See Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 577-78, 580 (Iowa 1973). In Freese, the
plaintiff was a bystander who was struck by a motorist who suffered an epileptic seizure and
lost control of his car. See id at 577-78. The plaintiff brought action against the motorist's
physician for failing to correctly diagnose the cause of a previous seizure and for failing to
warn the motorist not to drive. See id at 578. The court held that a cause of action did exist
against the physician. See id.at 580. In Wharton Transp. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521
(Tenn. 1980), Wharton, a truck company, employed a driver who subsequently was involved in a wreck injuring several people. See id at 522. The injured parties recovered
from Wharton, and Wharton in turn sued a physician who had given the driver a pre-employment physical and certified the driver as fit. See id at 522. Wharton claimed that negligently undisclosed disabilities of the driver were the proximate cause of the wreck and
subsequent injuries. See id at 522. The court held that the physician could be held liable to
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requiring a physician to protect others from certain infections." A brief
concurrence found that this "limited duty to warn" rule was unnecessary
because a cause of action arose under the common law.
The decision of the Tyler Court of Appeals in Gooden is consistent with
a modern trend in other jurisdictions addressing third party liability of
physicians.' While courts have discussed the privity relationship in determining third party liability of other professionals, 47 the Tyler court only
briefly mentioned it. 4 ' By relying solely on a test of foreseeability, the
court essentially disposed of the doctrine of privity without an initial determination of its applicability to physicians. 49 This failure to discuss the
issue of privity in a case of first impression provides little insight for other
courts in determining third party liability of physicians under different
circumstances.
The Tyler court unnecessarily avoided the issue of privity.5" Instead of
relying solely on the three out-of-state cases involving physicians, the court

third parties who suffered reasonably foreseeable injuries stemming from the physician's
negligence. See id. at 527. The plaintiff in Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14
(Wash. 1965) was a passenger on a bus. See id. at 15. The driver of the bus lost consciousness due to a drug prescribed by his physician and ran the bus into a telephone pole, thereby
injuring the plaintiff. See id at 15. The plaintiff sued the bus company and, in the alternative, the physician. See id. at 15. The bus driver testified that the physician failed to give
him warning of any side effects the drug might have. See id at 15. The court held that there
was sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury to determine the physician's negligence
because, if the physician failed to issue a warning, the harm to the plaintiff would have been
a foreseeable type. See id at 16.
44. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4445, §§ 1, 4 (Vernon 1976) (requires physician
who diagnoses or treats case of gonorrhea, syphilis or chancroid to report to health officials);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-11, §§ 4, 4A, 5 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (requires
physician who treats or diagnoses case of tuberculosis to report to health officials). The
court stated that a duty imposed upon a physician to protect the public was not a new
concept because these statutes require a physician to report to a health official, who in turn
undertakes precautions to protect the public fiom infection. See Gooden v. Tips, 651
S.W.2d 364, 370-71 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
45. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 372 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ) (Colley,
J., concurring).
46. See Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa 1973); Wharton Transp. Corp.
v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. 1980); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14,
16 (Wash. 1965).
47. See, e.g., Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895, 898-99, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699, 703-04 (1957) (discussing and abandoning privity doctrine as to architects);
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971,
writ refd n.r.e.) (discussing and rejecting privity requirement as to accountants); Bell v.
Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 338-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing
and upholding privity doctrine as to lawyers).
48. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
49. See id at 369-70.
50. See id at 369-70.
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could have strengthened its decision by noting similar cases that involved
other professions but which dealt with the issue of privity. 5 ' Common elements exist between third party recovery against architects and against
physicians in that the harm sustained can be physical, the risk is foreseeable, a third party is injured, and the proximate cause of the harm is the
professional's negligence in rendering a service for the client or patient. 2
Since the majority of courts have abandoned the requirement of privity in
negligence suits against architects, analogy dictates that a cause of action
against physicians should not turn on the issue of privity alone.53 Moreover, Texas, along with the majority of jurisdictions, recognizes third party
liability against accountants in the absence of privity when the injury involved is purely economic.54 Although it has been argued that no distinction should be made between physical and purely economic harm in third
party suits,-5 courts have been more lenient in allowing recovery for physical injuries.5 6 It only seems logical that having allowed recovery for third
party economic injuries,57 Texas courts should not hesitate to permit third

51. See Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895, 898-99, 164 N.Y.S.2d
699, 703-04 (1957) (architects may be liable to third parties); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.) (accountants may be liable to third parties). Texas, however, conforms to the majority view that
lawyers are not liable to third parties. See Graham v. Turcotte, 628 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
52. Cf. Ward, ProfessionalMalpractice: The Extent of Liability In Texas andElsewhere,
42 TEx. B.J. 117, 120 (1979) (noting the common elements between third party recovery in
products liability suits and third party recovery from architects).
53. See Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Iowa 1973) (privity not an issue in
determing physician's third party liability); Wharton Transp. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d
521, 527 (Tenn. 1980) (lack of privity not controlling in physician's third party liability);
Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965) (foreseeability of harm not
privity determines physician's third party liability).
54. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (third party recovery allowed for economic damage caused by
reliance on negligently prepared audit); see also, e.g., Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F.
Supp. 340, 343-44 (D. Neb. 1979) (recovery allowed for third party injury caused by reliance
on recklessly prepared accounting documents); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 297
(Minn. 1976) (third party recovery allowed for accounting firm's negligence in failing to
discover officers who were embezzeling funds from insurance company); Aluma Kraft Mfg.
v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (recovery allowed for
damages to third party due to reliance on negligently prepared audits).
55. See Bresser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach To The Liability Of Accountants To
Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL 507, 512-13 (1976). Because the privity doctrine does not
preclude recovery when physical injuries are incurred by third parties, the same result
should follow for economic injures. See id. at 512.
56. See James, Limitations on Liabilityfor Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: 4
PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 44 (1972).
57. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
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party recovery for physical harm solely because of a lack of privity.5 8
The main support underlying the privity doctrine as applied to physicians is to protect the physician from unlimited liability.59 The negative
consequence of this policy, however, is an outright bar on all third party
claims against negligent physicians.6" By replacing privity with an ordinary negligence standard, the requirement of foreseeability of the harm
still effectively shields the physician from unlimited liability and at the
same time allows an injured third party a cause of action against the physician whose negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.6' While extending this burden to physicians may cause their expenses to increase to
an even greater amount, these additional costs can in turn be passed on to
the public.6 2 This approach complies with the policy that it is more just for
the public to bear the cost of an injury than the sole injured party.6 3
Although the Tyler Court of Appeals failed to confront the privity doctrine in Gooden, the court was correct in holding that an injured third
party could bring a cause of action against a physician who failed to warn
his patient not to drive while taking prescribed drugs, if the physician's
negligence was the proximate cause of the third party's injury. Rather
than applying the privity doctrine which disallows recovery even for foreseeable injuries to third parties, an ordinary negligence standard was used.
A negligence standard properly upholds the purpose behind the privity
requirement in that liability is still limited; it is limited to only those injuries which are foreseeable. In addition, the negligence standard effectively
places the moral blame on the blameworthy party. It has been said that

58. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
59. Cf Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (liability of indeterminate amount would result if no requirement of privity); see also Rozny v. Marnul, 250
N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ill. 1969) (quoting rationale in Ultramares); Anderson v. Boone County
Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. 1967) (stating rationale in Ultramares); Comment,
Liability Of Architects And Engineers To Third Parties- 4 New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 306, 313 (1977) (purpose of privity to protect against unlimited liability).
60. See Ward, Professional Malpractice: The Extent of Liability In Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEx. B.J. 117, 120 (1979). A physician whose acts were the proximate cause of a
third party's injury would be excused from all liability if privity were required, regardless of
how negligently he acted. See id at 120; Comment, Liability OfArchitects And Engineers To
Third Parties.-A New Approach, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 306, 311 (1977) (no privity with
professional, no recovery).
61. See Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369-70 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
62. Cf Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968). In the accounting profession the risk of loss to third parties is more fairly distributed by placing the burden
on the accountants rather than innocent third parties. See id at 91. Accountants will, in
turn, pass the cost of increased insurance rates to cover the risk on to the entire consuming
public. See id at 91.
63. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39 (1970). Accident losses are less
burdensome if they are spread among a large number of people. See id at 39.
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when the purpose of the law ceases to exist, so too should the law. 64 It
only follows that the doctrine of privity should be abandoned when applied to physicians.
Kevin L. Kelley
64. See Holmes, The Path Of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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